All About Information

On June 2nd, a New Brunswick Provincial Court judge excluded evidence on a hard drive obtained by the Canada Revenue Agency pursuant to a search warrant.

The dispute related to files that were stored on the hard drive but were also beyond the temporal scope of the search warrant and over which the accused consistently asserted an expectation of privacy. The motions judge found that the CRA did not act improperly by seizing the hard drive, but breached section 8 of the Charter because it did not immediately file an amended return before the issuing judge and undertake not to use the out-of-scope records. He found a second breach because the CRA, instead, used the out-of-scope records to file a second search warrant in another unrelated investigation. The judge cited Celanese after stressing the government’s duty to exercise caution in searching intermingled documents.

Given the nature of storage of computer records and the process of identification and retrieval, seizure of a computer hard drive could inadvertently effect seizure of documents outside the time frame specified in the warrant.

However, seizing agents must be mindful both of the potential for intermingled documents in computer searches and the need to exercise discretion in protecting documents seized in such manner.

The section 24(2) analysis turned on the seriousness of the breach, which the judge characterized as a “clear pattern of a continuous obtrusive breach.”

R. v. Daley, 2008 NBPC 29 (CanLII).

In this February 12 arbitration award, Arbitrator Albertyn articulates a novel and forgiving standard for use of surreptitious video surveillance as follows:

The proper context for evaluating the reasonableness of the decision to undertake the surveillance is not the ideal circumstance in which no stone is left unturned. Every aspect of the motivation need not be perfect and yet the decision may be reasonable. The question is one of weight. In every context in which a surveillance decision is made, there will be some things the employer failed to think about, there will be some check or some information which could usefully have been obtained in advance, which the employer failed to obtain. Hindsight and skilful advocacy will show what more could have been done. A gap here or there will not necessarily be fatal, though, to the reasonableness of the decision. Determining the reasonableness requires making a decision as to whether, taken overall with the lack of information that might have been obtained, and with the information that was available and was obtained, was the employer cavalier, capricious, arbitrary or careless in arriving at the decision to initiate surveillance. If, taken overall, despite the flaws in the information the employer had, the employer can show itself to have been bona fide, thoughtful and careful in arriving at the decision, and to have had substantive grounds for suspicion, the surveillance will be reasonable.

The reasonableness standard applies because the mutual respect of management and employees requires that an employee be given the benefit of the doubt until the employee has given some reasonable cause for the employer to believe (possibly erroneously) that the employee is cheating, taking advantage of the situation and obtaining a benefit that is not justified.

In the circumstances, Mr. Albertyn allowed the evidence to be admitted. He said:

I find, despite some deficiencies, that Ms. Peters had reasonable cause for her decision to use surveillance. As Employer counsel submits, Ms. Peters was not acting on a whim. From her perspective, the Grievor had been duplicitous in the past, her attendance record was bad, she appeared not to have needed physiotherapy when she worked previously at PMH, there were no restrictions on what the Grievor could do at work yet the physiotherapy had gone on for many weeks, and, had Ms. Peters asked the Grievor for consent to check on her continuing need for physiotherapy, she thought she might face another harassment complaint. Taken together, there was enough for her to doubt the veracity of the Grievor’s continuing visits to physiotherapy, week after week, and to warrant undertaking a check to see if her suspicions were justified.

Re University Health Network and Ontario Public Sector Employees Union, 2008 CanLII 4546 (ON L.A.).

On February 22nd, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed a Charter application that claimed RBC violated section 8 of the Charter in investigating a case of mortgage fraud.

RBC had collected information from T-D Bank which allowed it to pursue an alleged fraud. Both banks are members of the Bank Crime Investigation Office of the Canadian Bankers Association, a designated “investigative body” under PIPEDA. They relied on sections 7(3)(d)(i) and (h.2) of PIPEDA in sharing the information. The Applicants took issue with these provisions and RBC’s actions taken in reliance on these provisions. They read:

(3)… an organization may disclose personal information without the knowledge or consent of the individual only if the disclosure is…

(d) made on the initiative of the organization to an investigative body… and the organization…

(i) has reasonable grounds to believe that the information relates to a breach of an agreement or a contravention of the laws of Canada, a province or a foreign jurisdiction that has been, is being or is about to be committed…

(h.2) made by an investigative body and the disclosure is reasonable for purposes related to investigating a breach of an agreement or a contravention of the laws of Canada or a province…

The Court held this grant of discretion to make disclosures did not necessarily threaten Charter rights, so was not unlawful itself. It also held that RBC was not acting as a government agent in its investigation and therefore was not bound directly by the Charter.

Royal Bank of Canada v. Welton, 2008 CanLI 6648 (ON S.C.).

The Supreme Court of Canada is scheduled to hear an appeal of Blood Tribe Department of Health v. Canada (Privacy Commissioner) on February 21, 2008.  The case will present an opportunity for the Court to comment on a principle it first articulated in 1982 in Descoteaux v. Mierzwinski - that laws authorizing interference with solicitor-client privilege must be interpreted restrictively.  Of perhaps greater interest, it will be the Court’s first opportunity to provide significant commentary on the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act.

The dispute arose when the respondent to a complaint alleging a failure to provide access to personal information refused to produce records of communications that it claimed to be subject to solicitor-client privilege.  In demanding the records be produced, the Commissioner relied on the investigatory powers granted by section 12 of PIPEDA, a broadly-worded provision which does not expressly grant the power to order the production of records over which solicitor-client privilege is claimed. 

Litigation ensued and the Federal Court held that the Commissioner had the power to order production.  It did so by applying a purposive analysis, stressing the Commissioner’s “central role in achieving the important objectives of the legislative scheme.”

The Federal Court of Appeal disagreed with the lower court’s approach, which it found to be inconsistent with the Mierzwinski strict interpretation principle and the concept of solicitor-client privilege as a substantive rule of law.  It stated:

In short, the reason express language is required to abrogate solicitor‑client privilege is because it is presumptively inviolate. The exception for solicitor‑client privilege in the PIPEDA is not what shelters privileged documents from disclosure. The law of privilege does that. The exception simply recognizes that privilege.

There are some finer points to the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision that may also catch the Supreme Court’s interest, including (1) whether the principles developed in interpreting the federal Privacy Act should be applied in interpreting PIPEDA and (2) what effect should be given to language authorizing the exercise of powers “to the same manner and to the same extent as a superior court.”

Blood Tribe is likely to remain relevant given that Parliament’s Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics made a rather moderate recommendation in its recent Statutory Review of the Personal Information and Electronic Documents Act.  Asked by the Privacy Commissioner to address the gap to her investigatory powers identified by the Federal Court of Appeal in Blood Tribe, the Standing Committee only recommended that PIPEDA be amended to expressly permit her to apply to the Federal Court for an expedited review of solicitor-client privilege claims. 

On October 4th, a 6-3 majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that an investigating police officer owes a private law duty of care to the suspect under investigation. This is a duty of care case and not directly about information and privacy. There are, however, a couple of points of significance to readers of this blog.

First, investigations obviously involve the collection of personal information, and the new duty will inform such collections. Unlike section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which only operates to restrict the collection of information, the new duty could conceivably require its collection. In fact, in this case one of the allegations was that the police breached their duty of care by failing to re-investigate after receiving exculpatory evidence after charges were laid. Based on the majority’s reasoning, there is no reason why a private investigator or a member of a company’s audit or security staff would not be found to be subject to an analogous duty quite apart from any factors related to the underlying relationship between the investigator’s principal and her suspect.

Second, this is the first time the Supreme Court of Canada has commented on the important Jane Doe duty to warn case, which was relied upon by the majority (of five judges) at the Court of Appeal in recognizing the new duty. Writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, McLachlin C.J.C. said that Jane Doe was not analogous and noted that there is significant debate over the content and the scope of its ratio. For the minority, Charron J., went further and explained:

Hence, the trial judge in Jane Doe held that where the police are aware of a specific threat to a specific group of individuals, the police have a duty to inform those individuals of the specific threat in question so that they may take steps to protect themselves from harm. As Moldaver J. (as he then was) said, speaking for the Divisional Court in confirming that the action could proceed to trial, “[w]hile the police owe certain duties to the public at large, they cannot be expected to owe a private law duty of care to every member of society who might be at risk”: Jane Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Commissioners of Police (1990), 72 D.L.R. (4th) 580, at p. 584. Hence, Jane Doe cannot be read to stand for the wide proposition that the police owe a general duty of care to all potential victims of crime. Such an interpretation would ignore the fact that there must be more than mere foreseeability of harm before a duty of care will arise; there must also be sufficient proximity between the parties and the absence of policy considerations negating the existence of any prima facie duty of care.

Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police, 2007 SCC 41.